Saturday, February 19, 2011

KI Media

KI Media


"Paro Para Panhaha Khmer Siem" a Poem in Khmer by Ung Thavary

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 04:16 PM PST

The silencing of cyber-critics

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 04:06 PM PST

Op-Ed by Khmerization
19th February, 2011

News that the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPTC) had ordered internet service providers to block 10 critical websites, including Khmerization, Ki-Media and Sacravatoons, is particularly disturbing. And freedom of information and free speech in Cambodia has been dealt a big blow and the democratisation process has surely suffered a setback.

Freedom of expression and free speech in Cambodia has been inscribed and guaranteed by the Cambodian constitution. And the blockage of critical websites is the last straw in the government's attempt to crack down and silence dissenting voices because of its inability to steer the course of their directions as well as controlling their editorial contents and the government's inability to intimidate them to fall in lines like it has successfully done with other printed and broadcast media.

Internet and digital media are increasingly finding themselves increasingly becoming very relevant in the society increasingly tightly controlled by the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) of Prime Minister Hun Sen. They are instrumental in presenting a counterweight and counter-view to the CPP-controlled media in playing a role in economic and political developments in Cambodia. In some cases, as with the recent uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, they have been a part of the growing push to overthrow the autocratic leadership of the present regime.

The internet has become the cornerstone of communications and information superhighway of a fast-growing digital age of the 21st century. It has become an instrumental tool in educating people as well as instigating the downfall of many dictators and dictatorial regimes around the world. This is the very reason that the Cambodian authority had ordered the blocking of many websites, including Khmerization, that are critical of the government and the current leadership.

Internet censorship will not necessarily succeed in the silencing of critical opinions and dissenting voices. Paradoxically, cyber-critics and cyber-dissenters would just shift their venues to some other modes of communications and criticism.

One name has come into prominence in the latest internet censorship saga, Sieng Sithy, the deputy director of the Directorate of Telecommunications Policy Regulation at the MPTC. This young man, who had boasted about his liberal education in America, has been engaging in the abuses of his liberal education and knowledge obtained from American tertiary institutions by applying the very principle contrary to the values espoused by the very education system that has nurtured him. However, one should give him the benefits of the doubt because in today's Cambodia nothing can be done without the order and approval of Prime Minister Hun Sen.

I believe that the blockage of websites critical of the government resulted from the government's paranoia of a Tunisia and Egypt-style people power revolution using internet as a communication tool. I believe that the present regime, which presented itself as a democratically elected government, has engaged in the suppression of the freedom of speech. There will be no benefits whatsoever which the government will gain from blocking websites critical of the government. However, this sort of the suppression of the freedom of speech will reflect negatively on the government that prides itself as the first popularly elected government in the history of Cambodia.

The blockage of critical websites will not and cannot silence critical and opposition voices. Khmerization has caught the ire of the Thai authority and been threatened with litigation by the Cambodian government many times before. However, I for one, will not be deterred and intimidated, but will continue to be critical of this government, all leaders and all political parties deemed to be corrupt, inept and traitorous to the Khmer nation.

Sowing the seeds of a lengthy conflict

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:58 PM PST

EXPLOSIVE: Kim Samnang, who lost his forearm; and what is believed to be a cluster bomb, found near Svay Chrum village.

20/02/2011
Bangkok Post

Ironically, Cambodia, which was one of the leaders on the convention to ban cluster mines, backed out of signing it in December 2008 citing the Preah Vihear border conflict.

Cambodia argued it was in no rush to sign, as Thailand was not yet a signatory. Cluster bombs are considered a major threat to civilian populations as they spread across a large area and can lay dormant for long periods of time.

ALLEGED CLUSTER BOMB ATTACK

''My base was shelled between 3:15-4:10pm on Feb 4,'' said Lt Col Sok Min of the Cambodian border police in Svay Chrum.

''I was standing at the gate looking at the mountain and I heard the sound of a bomb approaching, and made it just in time to the bunker.

''The only thing I could hear was BOOM, pop, pop, pop _ like popcorn _ and all I could see was smoke.''

Border policeman Kim Samnang said the bombs were distinctive by their sound. ''I suspected there was something different when I heard the pop-pop-pop,'' he said. ''I had heard about bomblets [cluster munitions] in other provinces.


''At 6pm the next day, we turned on the generator to pump water and decided to watch the Sunday boxing.

''Someone came in with this thing with a white string and I put my hand up and told him to put it down,'' he said.

Policeman Cheng Mol put it on the table and it exploded - killing two, and injuring eight.

Samnang and Mol both lost forearms. They now share a ward at Siem Reap provincial hospital.

''I was injured by cluster munitions,'' Samnang told the Bangkok Post Sunday ''Two days ago, an NGO showed us a photo. It had slightly different colouring, but it's the same kind of bomblet. It looked like a cow bell or something,'' Mol said.

The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) arrived on the scene the morning after the explosion.

''I had never seen anything like them before, they're not like the American War bomblets,'' said Saem Ponnreay, CMAC Demining Unit 3 manager.

''People were playing with the things, spinning them in the air by their cords. We sent photos to headquarters and they confirmed that they were M42/46 submunitions.

''We had recently cleared this area. Now we have to come back.''

CMAC issued a statement on Feb 10 claiming that: ''During the cross-fire there [was] identified evidence of heavy artilleries such as 105mm, 130mm and 155mm used by Thai military, and CMAC experts have confirmed that these artilleries contained cluster munitions including M35, M42 and M46 types.''

Cluster Munition Coalition member Sister Denise Coughlin surveyed the situation this week. ''I am saddened by the suffering and displacement of people from both sides of the border. I witnessed with my own eyes, cluster munitions on the ground,'' she said.

''I have also spoken to the victims who identified the M46 as the munition that injured them.

''The use of cluster bombs causes devastating consequences years after the conflict. A friend of mine lost both his arms in 2004, from cluster munitions left over from the 70s.

''I dont want that to happen to anyone else.''

In a statement issued on Feb 10, the coalition, which represents 350 civil groups worldwide, asked both Thailand and Cambodia to clarify whether their armies had used cluster munitions in the recent conflict.

According to the coalition, both countries have stockpiles of cluster munitions, but little is known about their status or composition.

Cambodia has cited an ongoing review of its defence and security situation as the reason for its delay in joining the treaty, while Thailand says it has concerns over its ability to destroy its stockpile although it has said previously it would not use the weapons.

CMAC faces a huge task, even if the fighting stops tomorrow. ''We don't know how many shells landed around here. Some could have fallen in unpopulated areas. There are 72 bomblets in every shell,'' Ponnreay said.

''Before we can let civilians back in, we need to educate them. We have reached 4,000 families in the camps and told them not to touch them, and to call our hotlines if they see one.''

When he appeared before the UN Security Council on Monday, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya categorically denied ''the groundless accusation by Cambodia that Thailand used cluster munitions during the recent skirmishes''.

Mr Kasit added that Thailand has been actively supporting disarmament efforts, including the elimination of cluster munitions.

''We are seriously considering joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions,'' he said. The army also strongly denied the Cambodian cluster bomb allegation.

Thailand, Cambodia agree to border truce

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:54 PM PST

MEMENTO OF VIOLENCE: A novice at Wat Siriwarawat in Si Sa Ket's Kantharalak district strikes a ''mortar shell bell''next to the temple's traditional brass bell.
'ALL IS WELL' AS TROOPS SIGN CEASEFIRE

20/02/2011
Wassana Nanuam
Bangkok Post

Thai and Cambodian troops signed a ceasefire agreement effective from noon yesterday.

"All is well," said Second Army commander Thawatchai Samutsakhon after the agreement was sealed at a restaurant at the Chong Sa-ngam Pass border crossing in Si Sa Ket province.

The ceasefire is a breakthrough in the raging border conflict following clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops in a disputed area near Si Sa Ket's Kantharalak district earlier this month.

However, it is unclear if the ceasefire will be permanent. A previous truce had been called on Feb 5 but violence flared up again the next day.

An army source said Lt Gen Thawatchai was part of the ceasefire-signing delegation led by Army chief-of-staff Daopong Rattanasuwan, who represented the Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha.


The delegation also included armed forces specialist Nipat Thonglek and Suranaree Taskforce commander Chavalit Choonprasarn.

The Cambodian side was led by deputy army commander Hun Manet, the son of Prime Minister Hun Sen.

The ceasefire was inked after more than two hours of meetings, which ended at 12.30pm yesterday.

The ceasefire took effect yesterday and the agreement contains seven other binding points.

The other points are; no more troops are to be deployed in the conflict zones and the existing troops stationed there must not move; no heavy armaments and artillery in the conflict areas may be moved; neither side may attack the other using heavy weaponry; no building or structure of any kind may be constructed inside the disputed 4.6 square kilometre border zone; no more military bunkers are to be built; no more road construction is allowed; and the senior military officers of both countries are to communicate via a dedicated mobile phone hotline in discussing border issues.

The arrangements over troops and weapons under the ceasefire agreement are pending future border negotiations at government level or until the next Asean ministerial meeting on Tuesday, which will be attended by all 10 member nations' foreign ministers.

"What the soldiers must do now is observe the ceasefire," said the source.

"The longer-term problems are for the respective governments to solve."

Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon and his Cambodian counterpart, Teah Banh, will meet at the Thai-Camobodian General Border Committee session in the middle of the year.

Lt Gen Hun Manet's involvement has raised Thailand's confidence that the ceasefire will be respected. But Thai security authorities have not ruled out a breach of the ceasefire as Cambodian troops do not always obey orders, the source said.

The source added both sides were in agreement that neither country benefits from the prolonged fighting.

The ceasefire meeting yesterday highlighted concerns over the precarious state of border security on Phu Makhua mountain in Si Sa Ket, which was the hotspot in the recent troop clashes.

The source said that during the meeting yesterday, Lt Gen Hun Manet asked why the Thai government has allowed certain media outlets to attack Cambodia over the border violence.

The outlets were understood to be controlled by the People's Alliance for Democracy, which has been highly critical of Cambodia in recent months.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said yesterday Unesco was sending a special envoy to hear both countries' take on the border dispute.

However, the envoy will not travel to the Preah Vihear temple due to "diplomatic sensitivity".

The envoy is expected to arrive in Thailand next week, Mr Abhisit said after a telephone conversation with Unesco director-general Irina Bokova yesterday.

He said the director-general felt the contentious management of the area around Preah Vihear temple, declared a world heritage site by Unesco, should not proceed until the border dispute is resolved.

Sout Al Horeya صوت الحريه " The sound of freedom"

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 12:28 PM PST

Why the world’s youth is in a revolting state of mind [-The Middle East situation reflects very well the ripe condition in Cambodia]

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 12:25 PM PST

February 18 2011
By Martin Wolf
Financial Times
In both cases, the young will raise a cry that has surely been heard throughout the ages: "It is not fair." They are right, no doubt. It never is. But they should remember that the young will win in the end. It is only a matter of time – just more of it.
In Tunisia and Egypt, the young are rebelling against old rulers. In Britain, they are in revolt against tuition fees. What do these young people have in common? They are suffering, albeit in different ways, from what David Willetts, the UK government's minister of higher education, called the "pinch" in a book published last year.

In some countries, the challenge is an excess of young people; in others, it is that the young are too few. But where the young outnumber the old, they can hope to secure a better fate through the ballot box. Where the old outnumber the young, they can use the ballot box to their advantage, instead. In both cases, powerful destabilising forces are at work, bringing opportunity to some and disappointment to others.

Demography is destiny. Humanity is in the grip of three profound transformations: first, a far greater proportion of children reaches adulthood; second, women have far fewer children; and, third, adults live far longer. These changes are now working through the world, in sequence. The impact of the first has been to raise the proportion of the population that is young. The impact of the second is the reverse, decreasing the proportion of young people. The third, in turn, increases the proportion of the population that is very old. The impact of the entire process is first to expand the population and, later on, to shrink it once again.


Contrast Egypt and the UK. Back in 1954, British life expectancy was 70 and the proportion of children dying between the ages of zero and five was 30 per 1,000. In the same year, an Egyptian could expect to live to 44, while infant mortality was a horrifying 353 per 1,000. Fast-forward to 2009: UK life expectancy was up to 80 and its infant mortality down to 5.5 per 1,000. But Egyptian life expectancy was up to 70 and its infant mortality down to 21; an astonishing transformation. The figures for the number of children per woman over these years are just as dramatic, falling from 2.3 to 1.8 in the UK, and 6.5 to 2.8 in Egypt. In Iran it has fallen even further, from 7.0 to 1.8. Religion simply does not determine fertility.

These are revolutionary changes, and ones that are happening far faster in developing countries than in the old advanced countries. Above all, these are happy developments: people are freed from fear of premature death; parents are freed from watching their children die young; and women are freed from endless childbirth.

Martin Wolf's Exchange
Martin Wolf elicits readers' views on current economic issues

Such great changes always bring huge social upheavals. Many developing countries are in the early stages of the demographic transition. This means they have more young adults than they might have expected; as recently as 1985 Egyptian mothers still had an average of six children. High-income countries, meanwhile, are entering the final stage of this transition. Their baby-boomers are ageing, with fewer young adults to support them.

In 2011, half of Egypt's population will be under 25, while 36 per cent will be aged from 15 to 35. These latter are angry young adults looking desperately for employment, in order at least to hope for normal family life. Meanwhile in the UK, where female fertility has been close to two for much longer, only 31 per cent are under 25, but 35 per cent over 50 (against only 15 per cent in Egypt).

Thus, the middle-aged and elderly rig political and economic life for their benefit in the UK: hence the way in which policies on housing or education finance are weighted against the young. In Egypt, the young could easily outvote the elderly. Hence the urgency of the forces behind a democratic revolution that should transfer more power into their hands. Egypt is not the first developing country, nor will it be the last, to be rocked by the youthful majority, at one and the same time idealistic and frustrated.

This, too, will pass. On current trends, the Egypt of 2040 is going to look rather more like the UK of today. According to the US census bureau, 26 per cent of the population will be over 50. But the UK will have moved onwards, as well: 41 per cent of its people could be over 50.

The future is grey. In today's high-income countries, it will be very grey. Indeed, some advanced countries could be older than the UK: Italy is forecast to have 50 per cent of its people over 50 by 2040, with as many as 9 per cent over 80.

As Shakespeare's Miranda might say in response: Oh brave old world! That has such ancients in it!

For the countries with a young population, the immediate challenge is to create a dynamic economy that brings hope of gainful employment. It is surely the failure to do this that most threatens rule by gerontocrats such as Hosni Mubarak. The Chinese leadership is well aware of this imperative. Rulers with resource wealth can try to buy off their young. Those without it cannot. They must at least offer jobs. If they fail, they will lose power – and rightly so. The political challenge is to harness the energy of their young, without succumbing to the catastrophes that hit high-income countries at a similar demographic stage: war, first and foremost.

Meanwhile, in high-income countries, older people must work longer than they expected, without making the young believe their opportunities are blocked for what must seem like an eternity. These countries must also balance the fiscal books as the populations age.

In both cases, the young will raise a cry that has surely been heard throughout the ages: "It is not fair." They are right, no doubt. It never is. But they should remember that the young will win in the end. It is only a matter of time – just more of it.

martin.wolf@ft.com

Repression sharpens hunger for change [- A lesson for the dictatorial regime in Phnom Penh]

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 12:20 PM PST

February 18 2011
By Roula Khalaf
Financial Times

The day after Egypt's Hosni Mubarak was forced out, the joke in Cairo was that the long-time leader next door, the eccentric Muammer Gaddafi, had abolished Fridays.

Both Mr Mubarak and Tunisia's Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali were ousted on a Friday and, curiously, they were swept away after delivering exactly three speeches, the last one on the day before their fall.

Every new dawn, however, marks a threatening day for the Middle East's remaining autocratic rulers

In Libya, activists had called for a Thursday protest on an emotionally charged day – the anniversary of the killing of demonstrators in a February 2006 protest against a Danish cartoon depicting the Prophet Mohammed. But two days earlier, clashes between police and demonstrators erupted in Benghazi, Libya's second city, and spread to nearby towns.


Colonel Gaddafi, in power since 1969 and with no desire to relinquish control, launched a brutal crackdown, leaving at least 24 people dead, according to New York-based Human Rights Watch.

No sooner had Egyptians celebrated their revolution than the protests in Yemen intensified, posing the most serious challenge to President Ali Abdullah Saleh's 33-year rule; Algerians too were encouraged to step up demonstrations against the regime of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

In Iran, the opposition Green movement, whose revolt in 2009 had been the envy of Arab populations from Cairo to Riyadh, was suddenly reinvigorated, sending massed crowds on to the street on Monday to remind the Islamic regime of their existence.

It was in the small Gulf state of Bahrain, however, where the Shia majority ruled by a Sunni minority regime had been agitating long before Tunisia's revolt erupted, that the new-found confidence of the Arab public appeared to erupt most powerfully this week.

Shia protesters took over the Pearl roundabout in the capital, Manama, to create their own mini Tahrir Square, the centre of Egypt's revolt, in what Bahrain's ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family might have seen as a challenge to its rule's existence. Security forces attacked sleeping activists and fired on protesters, further enraging the Shia community.

Sadly, the Middle East's autocratic rulers are still deaf to the message of Tunisia and Egypt, incapable of understanding that their survival depends not on the use of force but on swift political progress that gives the disgruntled public a share of power.

In the changing Middle East, Bahrain's al-Khalifas cannot continue to rule through denial, ignoring that Shia grievances are the product of real discrimination. Col Gaddafi too cannot govern Libya under the pretence that it is a "people's Jamahiriya".

True, every country has its circumstances, and the outcome of popular protests is not guaranteed. As Peter Ackerman, founder of the US-based International Centre for Nonviolent Conflict, says, there is no formula for success but there are "better ways of doing things". Some of the key elements are the unity of the protest movement and its non-violent nature, its planning, and the ability to shift the loyalty of the regime's pillars.

In the case of Libya, a vast country with a dispersed population of 6m and where Col Gaddafi has kept people quiescent by bribing tribal leaders and playing them off against each other, it is not clear that disparate groups can produce a sustainable movement. Libya's leader, flush with oil revenues, already offered this week to double salaries, according to news reports.

The biggest challenge of Bahraini demonstrators, meanwhile, is the sectarian divide. Shia protesters face a Sunni minority regime that can count on the loyalty of its constituency and, most importantly, on security forces deliberately built up to exclude Shia.

In Iran as well, the crackdown is led not by the traditional army, which is the least loyal to the Islamic republic, but by the Basij militia and the riot police of the Revolutionary Guard.

Putting down protests by force might buy time but does not secure long-term protection. The more repressively governments in the Middle East behave, the more radicalised is the opposition they face. By Friday in Bahrain, as families were burying their dead, earlier calls for constitutional reform had given way to the clamour for regime change.

The J-curve hits the Middle East [- Will this be an inspiration for Khmer from all walks of life to get up and fight for freedom, liberty and justice?]

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 12:14 PM PST

17 Feb 2011
Ian Bremmer
Financial Times

No one could predict that the death of a Tunisian vegetable vendor would spark revolts across the Middle East, threatening regimes from Libya to Iran. But while these shockwaves might seem chaotic, they are in fact only the latest example of a powerful political phenomenon: the J-curve, or the dip in stability as countries move from closed to open societies. The concept also explains why many of the region's governments are now caught in what may prove to be an inescapable trap.

The theory goes like this. If you plot the relationship between a country's stability (on the vertical axis) and its social and political openness (on the horizontal axis) the points that mark every possible combination of openness and stability will produce a pattern that resembles the letter J. Most countries start off closed and stable (think: North Korea). Many end up open and stable (like Britain). But in between there is a turbulent transition. Some governments, such as post-apartheid South Africa, survive this transition. Others – the Soviet Union, Iran under the shah and the former Yugoslavia – do not.


This presents a dilemma for the Middle East. In recent years, globalisation has provided more young Arabs with access to education, media and travel – innovations that make it more difficult for a ruling elite to control information and power. If governments, such as Egypt's, relax their grip to stoke economic growth (by opening their societies to deeper integration with the outside world) they risk sharp social and political upheaval. Yet if they keep things closed, they sharply limit the power of their economies to generate the prosperity on which longer-term political legitimacy will depend. And that too creates instability.

The J-curve is a controversial idea. When I first floated it in 2006, it was used – in some ways hijacked – by those seeking to explain the unstable postwar environment in Iraq. But an intervention bringing democracy by force was always a poor example of the theory. The current upheavals in the Middle East, the result of internal dynamics of populations trapped between economic hardship and increasing political openness, make a much better test.

Most regimes in the Middle East and north Africa have tried to remain stable by cutting off their citizens from the modern world. Globalisation's progress has been slow across the region. But over the past decade these efforts have come undone. People have taken up mobile phones, watched satellite television and switched on Facebook and Twitter. Autocratic governments, in turn, have had to expend more and more effort containing these potent weapons of free expression.

It is true there are obvious counterexamples to this trend. Some strongly authoritarian regimes have avoided significant domestic pressures, because strong economic growth has effectively pushed up the entire J-curve. After 30 years of state-directed growth, China is under much less internal political pressure than the Middle Eastern regimes. Nonetheless, China's leadership is keenly aware that economic success is required to maintain the regime's survival – an implicit admission that openness and order remain in tension underneath.

Given the Middle East is unlikely to see a new economic miracle, what should its pressurised leaders do? They face two options. Those with the most isolated populations can repress them, hoping to stay on the left of the curve. Leaders of Algeria, Iran and Yemen now ride to and fro upon tigers that they dare not dismount, as Winston Churchill once put it. Ultimately, that is a dangerous ride – as Tunisia's Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali can attest.

But opening up reform – the Jordanian route – is risky too. It costs King Abdullah little to replace one prime minister, but new faces alone will not create jobs or prosperity. Real reform will be much riskier, as it requires a surrender of some state control. King Abdullah must now calculate whether he is more likely to survive as a real reformer or as the man who kept the genie in the bottle for another year.

No countries are watching Jordan more keenly than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and a currently restive Bahrain. Unrest in their neighbour will make all three more cautious about allowing citizens to speak their minds. With oil and gas to export – and smaller populations with which to share the spoils – these three are actually better placed to begin sweeping reform. But, looking back to Tunisia, even the region's richest now know a single spark can ignite a country. Even those who can best afford the instability that accompanies the depths of the J-curve may be too fearful to begin the journey.

The writer is the president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market.

Speak Truth To Power: Voices from Beyond the Dark

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:35 AM PST

The Play by Ariel Dorfman, performed by famous celebrities.

My Rights, My Responsibility (ICCPR) Series

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:32 AM PST

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Ratified, acceded by UN General Assembly in December 1966, entry into force March 1976. Cambodia ratified the ICCPR (thus, a part of Cambodia's body of laws) and is obligated to submit regular reports to the United Nations.

PART IV
Article 39

1. The [Human Rights] Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re-elected.

2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia, that:

(a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum;

(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members present.


Month of LOVE

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:27 AM PST

Love begins by taking care of the closest ones— the ones at home.


- Mother Teresa


My Rights, My Responsibility (Constitution) Series

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:24 AM PST

Constitution of Cambodia (Sept. 1993)

CHAPTER V: ECONOMY
Article 64

The State shall ban and severely punish those who import, manufacture sell illicit drugs, counterfeit and expired goods which affect the health and life of the consumers.


Warmonger PAD Thais are not interested in peace with Cambodia

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:45 AM PST

Activists urge Thai govt not to sign permanent ceasefire agreement with Cambodia

BANGKOK, Feb 19 (MCOT online news) -- Activists of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) who have been holding a rally in the Thai capital for nearly a month demanding the ouster of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's government for mishandling the Thai-Cambodian border conflict demanded on Saturday that the government must not sign a permanent ceasefire agreement with Cambodia, saying that conditions proposed earlier by his counterpart Hun Sen were "insincere," said PAD spokesman Panthep Puapongpan.

Mr Hun Sen on Thursday said in Phnom Penh that Cambodia would urge Thailand to agree to a peace deal during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting, to be held in Jakarta next Tuesday, and a ceasefire agreement be signed between foreign ministers of the two neighbouring countries under the witness of ASEAN or the ASEAN chair.

The upcoming ASEAN foreign ministers meeting will be held with an aim to finding ways to end the border conflict and clashes at the disputed border between soldiers of the two countries.


But Mr Panthep said conditions proposed by Cambodia are "insincere because that country has accused Thailand on several occasions" and if an agreement has to be signed then Cambodian villagers and soldiers must move out of the disputed area or before memos by Thai-Cambodian Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) are formally signed.

PAD's long standing position is to oppose Thai parliamentary endorsement of the three memos by the JBC, claiming they may result in loss of Thai territory adjacent to the Hindu Preah Vihear temple. They have also demanded the revocation of MoUs signed between Thailand and Cambodia in 2000.

The Yellow Shirt movement believes that the JBC documents will put Thailand at a disadvantage as the documents originating from the MoUs related to the survey and boundary demarcation recognising a French map, with a scale of 1:200,000 sq km, that puts Thailand at risk of losing territory.

Another PAD core leader Prapan Koonmee said he had received a letter issued by the Royal Thai Police Bureau asking him and other core leaders to report themselves to Bangkok Metropolitan Police headquarters next Tuesday on charges of violating the Internal Security Act since PAD members have been holding the rally in Bangkok since January 25.

Challenging the police order, Mr Panthep said the enforcement of the Act is tantamount to violating the constitution and the right to freedom of assembly.

Warmonger PAD Thais are not interested in peace with Cambodia

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:43 AM PST

Activists urge Thai govt not to sign permanent ceasefire agreement with Cambodia

BANGKOK, Feb 19 (MCOT online news) -- Activists of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) who have been holding a rally in the Thai capital for nearly a month demanding the ouster of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's government for mishandling the Thai-Cambodian border conflict demanded on Saturday that the government must not sign a permanent ceasefire agreement with Cambodia, saying that conditions proposed earlier by his counterpart Hun Sen were "insincere," said PAD spokesman Panthep Puapongpan.

Mr Hun Sen on Thursday said in Phnom Penh that Cambodia would urge Thailand to agree to a peace deal during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting, to be held in Jakarta next Tuesday, and a ceasefire agreement be signed between foreign ministers of the two neighbouring countries under the witness of ASEAN or the ASEAN chair.

The upcoming ASEAN foreign ministers meeting will be held with an aim to finding ways to end the border conflict and clashes at the disputed border between soldiers of the two countries.


But Mr Panthep said conditions proposed by Cambodia are "insincere because that country has accused Thailand on several occasions" and if an agreement has to be signed then Cambodian villagers and soldiers must move out of the disputed area or before memos by Thai-Cambodian Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) are formally signed.

PAD's long standing position is to oppose Thai parliamentary endorsement of the three memos by the JBC, claiming they may result in loss of Thai territory adjacent to the Hindu Preah Vihear temple. They have also demanded the revocation of MoUs signed between Thailand and Cambodia in 2000.

The Yellow Shirt movement believes that the JBC documents will put Thailand at a disadvantage as the documents originating from the MoUs related to the survey and boundary demarcation recognising a French map, with a scale of 1:200,000 sq km, that puts Thailand at risk of losing territory.

Another PAD core leader Prapan Koonmee said he had received a letter issued by the Royal Thai Police Bureau asking him and other core leaders to report themselves to Bangkok Metropolitan Police headquarters next Tuesday on charges of violating the Internal Security Act since PAD members have been holding the rally in Bangkok since January 25.

Challenging the police order, Mr Panthep said the enforcement of the Act is tantamount to violating the constitution and the right to freedom of assembly.

Indonesia Reiterates Need For Peaceful Resolution Of Thai-Cambodia Row

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:36 AM PST

TOKYO, Feb 19 (Bernama) -- Visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said Friday that Cambodia and Thailand must jointly reiterate their commitment not to use force amid ongoing border skirmishes, Japan's Kyodo news agency reported.

At a news conference at the Japan National Press Club, Natalegawa said Thailand and Cambodia must "reinforce or reiterate the commitments that the two sides have repeatedly made that they will not wish to resort to the use of force in solving the problem between them."

"Given the nature of the two countries today, I feel that this commitment must be made together, rather than simply made separately," he said.

The remarks came ahead of a meeting in Jakarta next Tuesday that will bring together the foreign ministers of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations to discuss the dispute between the two countries. Indonesia currently holds the rotating chair of Asean.


The latest round of a territorial dispute from Feb 4 between Cambodia and Thailand over 4.6 square kilometers of land around the Preah Vihear temple on the border has led to at least 10 deaths, dozens injured and over 25,000 displaced persons.

Natalegawa visited Phnom Penh and Bangkok earlier this month in a bid to mediate in the conflict. The UN Security Council expressed "grave concern" Monday over the border skirmishes and called on both sides to establish a "permanent" cease-fire.

The Indonesian foreign minister added that work must be done on "how to compromise (on) the two extreme ideas" to resolve the issue, one being to deploy a multilateral framework involving a third party and the other for bilateral negotiations.

"Gone are the days when Asean swept things under the carpet, not addressing issues head-on. This time around we wish to confront issues head-on to bring peace and harmony whenever there are difficulties between Asean states as we are doing between Cambodia and Thailand," he said.

To address the issue of territorial tensions among China and Asean members in the South China Sea, Natalegawa said Indonesia aims to finalise guidelines to strengthen the code of conduct, signed by the two sides in 2002 to ensure that the disputes are resolved diplomatically to avert military conflict.

"The management of potential conflict of the South China Sea is one of the highest priorities for Indonesia," he said.

"To finalise the guidelines, it would require a lot of efforts and especially cooperation by all the parties, including China."

He also emphasised Indonesia's bid in creating a maritime forum for the East Asia region, where countries can discuss various maritime challenges such as security, militarisation of fishing vessels and environmental issues and also transparency in military procurement.

Natalegawa met with Prime Minister Naoto Kan before completing his two-day visit.

Thai army meets Cambodian generals

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:34 AM PST

19/02/2011
Bangkok Post

Army-chief-of staff Gen Daopong Rattanasuwon had on Saturday morning held ceasefire talks with Cambodian Deputy Supreme Commander Gen Jia Dara at Chong Sangam in Surin province, reports said.

The meeting was held about 10.30am today, but it was kept secret, the reports said.

Top brass attending the meeting were commander of Army Region 2 Lt-Gen Thawatchai Samutsakorn and Cambodia's Army Region 4 commander Lt-Gen Jia Mon, according to the reports.

[Thai] PM admits border tension has impacted case against Veera and Ratree

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:28 AM PST

BANGKOK, Feb 19 (MCOT online news) -- Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva admitted that Thai Cambodian border tension has affected legal proceedings to help two Thais jailed in Cambodia while affirming that the government is still exploring ways to help free them.

The Cambodian court on Feb 1 ruled that Veera Somkwamkid, Thai Patriots Network coordinator, and his secretary Ratree Pipattanapaiboon were guilty of espionage, illegal entry, and trespassing in a military zone. They were sentenced to an eight-year jail term and a 1.8 million riel (US$450) fine for Mr Veera and a six-year jail term and a 1.2 million riel (US$300) fine for Ms Ratree. An appeal could be filed within 30 days.

Mr Abhisit said the government has to study options to help them and that as far as he knows, the families of Veera and Ratree have not yet submitted a request to seek a royal pardon from the Cambodian King. The premier said he had told their two families to think carefully before making a decision whether to appeal or request a royal pardon. The border tensions had also affected the case, he added.


Asked whether the leaders of the two nations could hold talks to speed up help for Veera and Ratree, Mr Abhisit said he would try, but the situation should be evaluated carefully as the political situation in Thailand and Cambodia was also affecting the case. He also urged the Thai Patriots Network to think twice before making decisions on movement, as it may have effect on Veera and Ratree. He said the government would do its best to help but steps must be taken with caution and good timing and not affect ties at the national level.

China's Xinhua news agency quoted Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen as saying that there would be no royal pardon for Mr Veera. "Don't come to persuade me to ask King Norodom Sihamoni for royal pardons. It is impossible at this time," said the Cambodian premier. He added, "Complying with the law properly, the two must serve at least two-thirds of their jail terms before being considered for royal amnesty."

Meanwhie, Mr Abhisit also denied reports that ASEAN was asked to send forces to prevent more border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia. He said Thailand reaffirmed its commitment to resolving any pending boundary issues peacefully through existing bilateral mechanisms.

The prime minister added that he was unaware Cambodia might take the disputed border case before the International Court of Justice for clarification on its 1962 ruling. The Court then ruled that the 11th century Preah Vihear temple belonged to Phnom Penh, but both countries have since been in dispute over a 1.8-square-mile (4.6-square-kilometre) tract of land near the temple.

SRP MP Saumura Tioulong at UN Meeting in New York

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:19 AM PST

Politiktoons No. 144: The Universal Town Square

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:15 AM PST

Cartoon by Sacrava (on the web at http://politiktoons.blogspot.com
and also at http://sacrava.blogspot.com)

Sinatoons No. 18: ASEAN

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:08 AM PST

CACJE's Invitation for 18 March 1970 Anniversary

Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:05 AM PST

European Parliament resolution​: Cambodia and Thailand are to respect ICJ Judgment 1962

Posted: 18 Feb 2011 10:39 PM PST






How to be a rich dictator- A DIY (Do It Yourself) guide by HE. Samdach Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. Hun Sen

Posted: 18 Feb 2011 10:29 PM PST


18 Feb 2011
James Thomson
BusinessSpectator (Australia)

Let's just get this clear from the start. It is extremely unlikely that deposed Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak is worth anywhere near $70 billion and he isn't close to being the richest person in the world.

The basis for his valuation, which has been carried across the world in various media reports, appears to emanate from an article in Britain's Guardian newspaper, which referenced "middle east experts" as having made the snap evaluation.

On closer inspection, Amaney Jamal, a political science professor at Princeton said an estimate of $40-70 billion for the Mubarak family fortune was "comparable with the vast wealth of leaders in other Gulf countries".

But as Forbes pointed out in a blog last week, the worth of the richest ruler in the region, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, has been put at $15 billion, which is a long way from $70 billion.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Mubarak did very well out his time in charge.

Despite receiving a salary of just $808 a year, Mubarak and his family – specifically his sons Gamal and Alaa – amassed billions of dollars by establishing a system of endemic corruption.


Exactly how much they squirrelled away in banks around the world (the Swiss banking system has already frozen the Mubarak's family assets) is unlikely to ever be revealed, but a sense of the regime's money-making ability can be gleaned from research by Global Financial Integrity, a not-for-profit organisation that tracks illicit financial flows.

It says a staggering $57 billion flowed out of Egypt between 2000 and 2008.

Regardless of the size of his fortune Mubarak joins a long list of dictators who have become fabulously wealthy on the back of their time in power.

According to Paul Barry's Dictator Watch on Crikey, the pack is led by former Indonesian president Suharto, who was crowned in 2004 by Transparency International as the world's most corrupt leader, with a fortune of $35 billion.

But it should be noted that building a fortune from political rule is no mean feat. Straight-out bribes are simply too obvious and dictators instead use their far-reaching power to build up a system from which they can siphon off money at multiple points.

Here are some of the steps that dictators must take to turn an iron grip into a giant fortune.

Get long-term control

Destroying all opposition is a key plank of any dictator's strategy, but it's also a key part of a corrupt ruler's money-making plans.

Building a corrupt system and moving money out of the country takes time, so the longer you can remain in power the better your chances of getting rich. Cancel elections, get friendly with the military and settle in for the long haul.

Put cronies in place

A money-making dictator needs to surround himself with people he can trust. Installing relatives in key posts is essential – Mubarak's sons Gamal and Alaa served as the president's key contacts with business in the latter years of the reign, with brothers-in-law and other relatives also given plum posts.

If you're really serious about turning a buck from politics, stacking parliament with business people – a classic Mubarak trick – is a great idea.

Regulate everything

And we mean everything. The more things a government can control the more ways it can make money. In Mubarak's Egypt for example, many businesses need a license to operate and then had to apply to get government quotas of raw materials.

An entrepreneur wanting to set up a bakery might need to pay a bribe to secure a licence and another bribe to secure a quota of wheat. As the business grew so would the bribes.

Controlling access rights and production levels in major industries is particularly important, especially in nations rich in minerals assets.

Share the wealth

Under the baker example above the bribes would go to local officials and not to Mubarak. But making sure that corruption is widespread – and that the little people get their palms greased – is essential if you want to ensure you remain in office and can pull off major deals.

Turn public assets into private wealth

The best way to raise cash is to sell stuff. And when you're a dictator you don't need to differentiate between your stuff and the country's stuff – just sell whatever you want.

As Samer Soliman, a professor of political economy at American University in Cairo, told the New York Times, the key to Mubarak's fortune was the sale of hundreds of public assets to private companies.

"The corruption of the Mubarak family was not stealing from the budget, it was transforming political capital into private capital," Soliman says.

Mubarak's privatisation campaign began in the 1990s with the goal of selling 314 companies.

According to a report from a USAID-sponsored monitoring program, by June 2002 there were 190 state assets owned. The program paused during the GFC and was stopped in 2010, when there were 149 companies still under state control, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal.

The Mubarak family and its cronies made money from privatisation, selling assets in sweetheart deals with mainly foreign business people.

A great example is a company called Tanta Flax & Oils Company, which was acquired by Saudi investor Abdellah El-Ka'aky in 2005.

The price was just $14 million, but Egyptian labour expert Mostafa Bassiouni told local newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm the business was actually valued at more than $500 million.

In some cases the assets were sold lock, stock and barrel to foreign investors – with appropriate "facilitation" payments no doubt extracted from the buyers.

In other cases the buyer was forced to take on an Egyptian joint venture partner who would take a stake between 20 per cent and 50 per cent.

According to reports, Mubarak had interests in many of those Egyptian-partner businesses, thereby completing the transfer of public assets into his private wealth.

Stash the loot

The Mubaraks are said to have favoured parking profits in property in London, New York and Paris, and in foreign bank accounts. Suharto liked art and jewels.

Personally I'd lean towards gold bars, which are universally accepted, hold their value and best of all are handily portable if you have to flee into exile.

Beware the backlash

The protests against Mubarak were mainly focused on bringing democracy to Egypt, although it could be argued that they had their origins in a long series of protests against the privatisation program.

In March 2010, almost 12 months before Mubarak's departure, Al-Masry Al-Youm said more than 1.7 million workers had engaged in more than 1900 strikes between 2004 and 2008.

Protests started at Tanta Flax & Oils in February and sparked a series of protests that forced the government to can the program in mid 2010.

In hindsight that's when Mubarak should have taken his cue to pull the plug.

Imagine how much more cash he could have taken with him.

From Dictatorship to Democracy - APPENDIX ONE: The Methods of Nonviolent Action

Posted: 18 Feb 2011 09:46 PM PST

KI Media's series on From Dictatorship to Democracy by Gene Sharp whereby a chapter from this book in both English and Khmer is published every 2-day interval, with prior chapters listed in the menu bar for easy recall.  The emphasis is that of KI Media.  For its original complete text go to:

This book has been translated into KHMER and its full version is available at:

Be inspired!  Be coordinated!  And take action!

KI Media
. . . . .


From Dictatorship to Democracy
APPENDIX ONE
The Methods of Nonviolent Action

The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion

Formal statements
1. Public speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public statements
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions

Communications with a wider audience
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting


Group representations
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections

Symbolic public acts
18. Display of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobings
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamations
30. Rude gestures

Pressures on individuals
31. "Haunting" officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils

Drama and music
35. Humorous skits and pranks
36. Performance of plays and music
37. Singing

Processions
38. Marches
39. Parades
40. Religious processions
41. Pilgrimages
42. Motorcades

Honoring the dead
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places

Public assemblies
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins

Withdrawal and renunciation
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one's back


The Methods of Social Noncooperation

Ostracism of persons
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic nonaction
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict

Noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions

Withdrawal from the social system
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation
67. Flight of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)


The Methods of Economic Noncooperation:

(1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS

Action by consumers
71. Consumers' boycott
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers' boycott
77. International consumers' boycott

Action by workers and producers
78. Workmen's boycott
79. Producers' boycott

Action by middlemen
80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott

Action by owners and management
81. Traders' boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants' "general strike"

Action by holders of financial resources
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government's money

Action by governments
92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers' embargo
95. International buyers' embargo
96. International trade embargo


The Methods of Economic Noncooperation:

(2) THE STRIKE

Symbolic strikes
97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)

Agricultural strikes
99. Peasant strike
100. Farm workers' strike

Strikes by special groups
101. Refusal of impressed labor
102. Prisoners' strike
103. Craft strike
104. Professional strike

Ordinary industrial strikes
105. Establishment strike
106. Industry strike
107. Sympathetic strike

Restricted strikes
108. Detailed strike
109. Bumper strike
110. Slowdown strike
111. Working-to-rule strike
112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
114. Limited strike
115. Selective strike

Multi-industry strikes
116. Generalized strike
117. General strike

Combinations of strikes and economic closures
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown


The Methods of Political Noncooperation

Rejection of authority
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

Citizens' noncooperation with government
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government departments, agencies and other bodies
127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions

Citizens' alternatives to obedience
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
138. Sitdown
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws

Action by government personnel
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative noncooperation
146. Judicial noncooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents
148. Mutiny

Domestic governmental action
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units

International governmental action
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representation
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organizations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organizations


The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention

Psychological intervention
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast
(a) Fast of moral pressure
(b) Hunger strike
(c) Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial
161. Nonviolent harassment

Physical intervention
162. Sit-in
163. Stand-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. Mill-in
167. Pray-in
168. Nonviolent raids
169. Nonviolent air raids
170. Nonviolent invasion
171. Nonviolent interjection
172. Nonviolent obstruction
173. Nonviolent occupation

Social intervention
174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theater
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system

Economic intervention
181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions

Political intervention
193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government

___________________________________________________

16 This list, with definitions and historical examples, is taken from Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action.

UN Rep Investigates Land Dispute

Posted: 18 Feb 2011 06:35 PM PST

Surya Subedi talks with Hun Sen (L) in Phnom Penh, Jan 19, 2010. (AFP)
2011-02-18
Radio Free Asia

A UN official visits the site of a land dispute as part of his inquiry into human rights in Cambodia.

A United Nations human rights representative visited a Cambodian village community embroiled in a land dispute on Friday as part of a fact-finding mission for a set of wider reforms he is recommending to the country's leadership.

The visit by Surya Subedi, the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Cambodia, came on the fourth day of a 10-day trip to the country, and followed a meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen where he expressed concerns about the country's court system and a new law on nongovernmental organizations.

Subedi told RFA that it is important to take the complaints of Cambodia's rural population into consideration in addition to speaking with high-level officials while forming an overview of the country's human rights situation.


"I wanted to speak to people from all walks of life in Cambodia, and I wanted to see the villagers for myself to listen to them directly—their grievances—and then see for myself the area where they are living now and the conditions there as well. This is purely a fact-finding mission and … [for] information gathering," Subedi said.

He traveled to the site, in central Kompong Chhnang province, to investigate a land dispute case in which NGO worker, who represented the villagers, had been jailed. The dispute was with a company owned by Lauk Chumteav Chea Kheng, the wife of Cambodia's mining minister.

Land grab

Sam Chankea was convicted in January of "defamation" against KDC International Co. after he told RFA in a 2009 interview that the company had committed an "act of violation" when it confiscated land from the villagers, because the provincial court had yet to rule on the disputed property.

The dispute dates back to 2002 when KDC International took possession of some 184 hectares (455 acres) of land from more than 100 families in the area.

"I now have a much better idea and information about the plight of the villagers and the disputed land," Subedi said.

"I will try to speak to government authorities about what they have been doing about this dispute and what the response of the other party has been and what other avenues there are to look after the interests of the villagers," he said.

"I will consider whether I will need to intervene at certain levels of government authorities, and if I decide to do so, I will not hesitate to do so."

Subedi said that he had a number of meetings scheduled with various ministers and that he planned to use the Pursat land case as an example of how the government must work to improve its human rights record.

Fact-finding meetings

In addition to meeting with the prime minister, Subedi has been busy since arriving in Cambodia on his fourth mission for the U.N., meeting with officials from the ruling party and from the opposition, observing trials, and speaking with NGOs.

On Wednesday, the special rapporteur met with Thun Saray, director of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) to discuss the concerns of domestic NGOs operating in the country.

"The problems include a land crisis that adversely affects the people. We propose a swift and satisfactory solution for those who have been affected by the land conflict," Thun Saray said in an interview recounting their conversation.

The land issue in Cambodia dates from the 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime, which forced large-scale evacuations and relocations throughout the country.

This was followed by mass confusion over land rights and the formation of squatter communities when the refugees returned in the 1990s after a decade of civil war.

Housing Cambodia's large, young, and overwhelmingly poor population has posed a major problem ever since.

Judicial reform

Thun Saray also advised Subedi that Cambodia's notoriously ineffective judicial system is in dire need of restructuring.

"The justice system should be reformed. We all see the shortcomings and flaws in the system. The reform should start by looking into the flaws point by point. For example, the flaws happen in the process of trials and court proceedings which result in unjust rulings," he said.

"The public is unsatisfied with the current process of court trials. We have to look, investigate these shortcomings, and fix them."

More than one-quarter of Cambodian court defendants reported being tortured or coerced into confession, and ordinary people said they lack faith in the justice system, according to a 2009 judicial review released by Cambodian anti-corruption organization The Center for Social Development.

Poor training of the judiciary, bribery, torture, underfunding, a lack of independence, and frequent pre-trial detention of prisoners for terms exceeding the legal limit of six months are among problems with the judiciary often cited by rights organizations.

At the end of his last visit in June, Subedi said the judiciary faced "tremendous challenges in delivering justice for the people of the country, especially the poor and marginalized," adding that some judges were simply not interested in upholding the law.

NGO law

Thun Saray also discussed a controversial draft law put forth by Cambodia's National Assembly which would severely curtail the ability of foreign and domestic NGOs operating in the country to carry out their work.

Last month a U.S. State Department spokesman said the United States had "serious concerns about the law as drafted and strongly opposes the enactment of any law that would constrain the legitimate activities of NGOs."

The State Department urged Phnom Penh to consult with NGOs on the substance of the draft law and to "reconsider whether such a measure is even necessary."

Cambodia's government has long had an antagonistic relationship with human rights groups and NGOs operating in the country.

Last year, Hun Sen said he wanted the U.N. human rights office in Cambodia closed and its representative, Christophe Peschoux, sacked.

Subedi is expected to hold a press conference in Phnom Penh on Feb. 24 during which he will review some of the key issues raised during his visit before compiling a report for the United Nations.

He last presented his findings to the U.N. in September 2010.

Reported by Pon Bun Song and Khe Sonorng for RFA's Khmer service. Translated by Vuthy Huot. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

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